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Abstract: Using the transition of US firms from annual reporting to semi-annual reporting and then 
to quarterly reporting over the period 1950-1970, we provide evidence on the effects of increased 
reporting frequency on firms’ investment decisions. Estimates from difference-in-differences 
specifications indicate that increased reporting frequency is associated with an economically large 
decline in investments. Additional analyses reveal that the decline in investments is most consistent 
with frequent financial reporting inducing myopic management behavior. Our evidence informs the 
recent controversial debate about eliminating quarterly reporting for US corporations.  
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Appendix 
1. Robustness to alternative matching approaches  
In this section, we report the robustness of our findings on the effect of reporting 
frequency increases on investments (i.e., Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5) to several alternative matching 
approaches to obtain treatment and control firms. First, we establish that our findings are robust 
to using a finer industry classification for matching purposes. Specifically, under this approach 
we obtain our treatment and control firms using propensity score matching based on Fama-
French 48 industry classification and firm size measured using total assets. Table A1 presents the 
results from this analysis. Our inferences are quite robust. 
Second, we document the robustness of our findings to matching on several other firm 
characteristics in addition to industry membership and size. Specifically, in addition to Fama-
French 10 industry classification and total assets, we augment the list of matching variables to 
also include Investment opportunities (INVESTOPP), EBITDA, leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), 
cash scaled by assets (CASH), and pre-treatment levels of both investment measures (CAPEX 
and CHPPE). Table A2, Panel A, presents the comparison of treatment and control firms along 
the matching variables. It can be seen that there are no statistically significant differences 
between treatment and control firms across any of the matching variables, including investment 
levels prior to the treatment shock. Table A2, Panel B presents the results of the regression 
analysis using this alternative matching procedure and again, the results are robust. 
Finally, in untabulated analyses, we also explore the sensitivity of our main results to several 
other variations in our matching approach including: (i) matching control firms within the same 
industry as treatment firms instead of propensity score matching on industries, (ii) allowing 
treatment firms to match up to 3 control firms instead of one-to-one matching, (iii) requiring 
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control firms to have propensity scores within a caliper of 0.05 or 0.01 of treatment firms instead 
of just using simple nearest neighbor matching with the restriction of common support, (iv) using 
probit instead of logit models for estimating propensity scores, (v) relaxing the requirement of 
common support, allowing us to identify a matched control firm for all of our treatment cases, 
and (vi) retaining all treatment and control cases in the sample by not imposing any matching 
requirements. We find that our inferences continue to remain unchanged.  
2.  Financial Slack Tests 
 In this section, we provide an additional test to differentiate between the disciplining and 
myopia channels by exploiting the contrasting predictions offered by the two channels regarding 
the role of financial slack. The disciplining channel predicts that the decline in investments 
should be more pronounced for firms with greater financial slack. Managers are more likely to 
overinvest when there is sufficient financial slack available to engage in overinvestment (e.g., 
Jensen, 1986). Therefore, if the decline in investment reflects a correction in prior 
overinvestment, we expect it to manifest for firms that had more financial slack prior to the 
reporting frequency increase. 
 The myopia channel predicts the opposite. Models of myopia show that myopia is more 
likely to manifest when there is greater capital market pressure and managers care more about 
short term stock price. Stein (1989) notes that lack of financial slack can be a source of capital 
market pressure. Managers of firms with less slack have greater incentives to improve short term 
earnings at the expense of longer run value in anticipation of future equity issuances and 
enhanced capital market scrutiny. Financial slack insulates managers from such capital market 
pressures. Thus, the myopia channel predicts that the decline in investments is less pronounced 
when the firm has greater financial slack in the pre-treatment periods.  
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To determine which of these two predictions are borne in the data, we divide the sample 
into high slack and low slack samples using three different proxies for financial slack, all of 
which are measured in the year prior to the reporting frequency increase. Our first proxy for 
financial slack is an index of financing constraints developed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Firms with higher values of the Kaplan-Zingales index are more likely to experience difficulties 
financing their ongoing operations. Therefore, we classify firms with below median values of 
Kaplan-Zingales index for the year prior to the treatment year as high slack firms.1 For our 
second proxy, we focus on the firm’s ability to pay dividends as it captures availability of free 
cash flows. We classify firms that paid a common dividend for the year prior to the treatment 
year as high slack firms. Finally, we follow the approach specified in Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
who document that firms’ financial constraints can be measured using an index based solely on 
firm size and age. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) determine the appropriate weights for combining 
size and age into a single financing constraints index using data over the period 1995 to 2004. To 
avoid using weights determined from a completely different period than our sample, we use a 
more flexible approach in which we partition the firms into different groups based on size and 
age independently. Specifically, we estimate separate regressions in which we classify firms with 
above median size and age to be less financially constrained.  
We estimate equation (1) for the two subsamples of high and low slack firms separately. 
Table A3 presents results for the three different approaches to capture financial slack and for 
both investment variables, CAPEX and CHPPE. Except for the size based partition of the 
Hadlock-Pierce model, we find that the investment decline manifests solely for low slack firms 
                                                 
1
  Kaplan-Zingales (1997) is calculated as ‒1.002×(net income + depreciation and amortization expense)/lagged 
PP&E + 0.2826389×(Total assets‒book value of common equity‒deferred tax _balance sheet + market cap of 
common equity)/total assets + 3.139193× Total debt/total assets – 39.3678×total dividend/lagged PP&E ‒ 
1.314759× cash and equivalent/lagged PP&E. 
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and it is statistically and economically insignificant for high slack firms. We view this evidence 
as broadly consistent with managerial myopia being the dominant source of the investment 
decline.  
 
6 
 
Table A1: Robustness to matching using finer industry classification 
 
This table presents evidence on the robustness of our findings on the effect of increased reporting frequency on investments to propensity score matching using 
Fama-French 48 industry classification and total assets. All variable definitions and specifications are similar to the ones used in Tables 2, 3 and 5 of the paper. 
All specifications include time-varying firm level controls, firm fixed effects, and state-year interactive fixed effects, except in columns (13) and (14) in which 
we replace state-year interactive fixed effects by industry-year interactive fixed effects. All regressions are estimated on the restricted sample of involuntary 
adopters except for columns (9) – (12) where under definition 1, we consider a treatment sample of firms that altered the reporting frequency surrounding the 
SEC mandate including three years prior to the SEC mandate to allow for early adopters. For definition 2, we consider a more stringent treatment sample 
consisting of firms that altered reporting frequency in the years following the SEC mandate. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated based on standard 
errors obtained by clustering at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 Main Results Timing of effects Alternative definitions of involuntary adopters 
 Definition 1 Definition 2 
 CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treat*Before(-1) 
  
0.007 
(0.838) 
 
-0.000 
(-0.029) 
 
    
    
             
Treat*Before(-2)     0.003 0.000       
     (0.441) (0.008)       
Treat*After 
-0.013** -0.017** -0.011* -0.016** -0.013** -0.017**   -0.012* -0.017** -0.015 -0.027** 
 (-2.182) (-2.497) (-1.645) (-2.155) (-1.962) (-2.345)   (-1.728) (-2.205) (-1.262) (-2.056) 
Treat*After(+1,+2)       -0.014** -0.017**     
       (-2.146) (-2.397)     
Treat*After(+3,+5)   
  
  
-0.013* -0.017**     
       (-1.944) (-2.255)     
             
Observations 5,469 6,490 5,469 6,490 5,469 6,490 5,469 6,490 4,630 5,157 2,546 2,849 
R-squared 0.642 0.525 0.642 0.526 0.642 0.525 0.642 0.525 0.635 0.522 0.651 0.562 
 
 Industry-Year interactive  Controlling for Life cycle effects 
 fixed effects Age Retained Earnings 
 CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Treat*After 
-0.016*** -0.017*** -0.013** -0.016** -0.011 -0.018** 
 (-2.923) (-3.109) (-2.107) (-2.387) (-1.525) (-2.434) 
       
Observations 6,452 7,818 5,469 6,490 4,660 5,067 
R-squared 0.635 0.502 0.643 0.527 0.659 0.569 
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Table A2:  Robustness to matching on additional firm characteristics 
 
This table presents evidence on the robustness of our findings on the effect of increased reporting frequency on 
investments to matching on several other firm characteristics in addition to just industry and size. Specifically, in 
addition to Fama-French 10 industry classification and total assets, we augment the list of matching variables to also 
include Investment opportunities (INVESTOPP), EBITDA, leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), cash scaled by assets 
(CASH), and pre-treatment levels of both investment measures (CAPEX and CHPPE). All variable definitions and 
specifications are similar to the ones used in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the paper. Panel A presents the covariate balance 
between treatment and control firms on the matching variables. Panel B presents results from the regression 
specifications. All specifications include time-varying firm level controls, firm fixed effects, and state-year 
interactive fixed effects, except in columns (13) and (14) in which we replace state-year interactive fixed effects by 
industry-year interactive fixed effects. All regressions are estimated on the restricted sample of involuntary adopters 
except for columns (9) – (12) where under definition 1, we consider a treatment sample of firms that altered the 
reporting frequency surrounding the SEC mandate including three years prior to the SEC mandate to allow for early 
adopters. For definition 2, we consider a more stringent treatment sample consisting of firms that altered reporting 
frequency in the years following the SEC mandate. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated based on 
standard errors obtained by clustering at the firm level. Statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Covariate balance on matching variables 
 
Treatment 
Mean 
Control 
Mean 
t-stat of 
difference 
ASSETS ($ millions) 103.547 113.419 0.658 
EBITDA 1.554 1.555 0.053 
INVESTOPP 0.203 0.200 -0.506 
LEVERAGE 0.149 0.145 -0.533 
CASH 0.111 0.105 -1.182 
CAPEX 0.096 0.098 0.396 
CHPPE 0.063 0.064 0.113 
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Table A2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: DiD estimates of the effect of reporting frequency increase on investments 
 
 Main Results Timing of effects Alternative definitions of involuntary adopters 
 Definition 1 Definition 2 
 CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Treat*Before(-1) 
  
0.003 
(0.396) 
 
0.003 
(0.363) 
 
    
    
Treat*Before(-2) 
   
 0.000 -0.004       
     (0.056) (-0.419)       
Treat*After 
-0.018*** -0.015** -0.017** -0.015* -0.018*** -0.016**   -0.018** -0.015* -0.028** -0.034*** 
 (-2.708) (-2.055) (-2.307) (-1.719) (-2.636) (-2.100)   (-2.510) (-1.907) (-2.289) (-2.828) 
Treat*After(+1,+2)       -0.015** -0.010     
       (-2.159) (-1.162)     
Treat*After(+3,+5)   
  
  
-0.020*** -0.020**     
       (-2.805) (-2.515)     
             
Observations 5,104 5,495 5,104 5,495 5,104 5,495 5,104 5,495 4,604 4,946 2,511 2,639 
R-squared 0.624 0.522 0.624 0.522 0.624 0.522 0.624 0.522 0.625 0.521 0.649 0.558 
 
 Industry-Year interactive  Controlling for Life cycle effects 
 fixed effects Age Retained Earnings 
 CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE CAPEX CHPPE 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Treat*After 
-0.017*** -0.015** -0.017*** -0.014* -0.020*** -0.018** 
 (-2.898) (-2.256) (-2.613) (-1.897) (-2.698) (-2.248) 
       
Observations 5,725 6,198 5,104 5,495 4,463 4,691 
R-squared 0.646 0.525 0.625 0.524 0.638 0.552 
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Table A3: Effect of financial slack 
 
This table presents evidence on how the decline in investments following reporting frequency increases depends on availability of financial slack prior to the 
increase in reporting frequency. We use three different approaches to identify firms with High (Low) financial slack: (i) firms with below (above) median value 
of financing constraints index from Kaplan and Zingales (1997; KZ index), (ii) firms that pay (do not pay) common dividends, and (iii) firms with above (below) 
median value of size and age. Coefficient estimates are obtained from a modified version of equation (1) that allows coefficients on all covariates to vary across 
different levels of financial slack. TREAT is an indicator for treatment firms, which are firms that experience an increase in reporting frequency. AFTER is an 
indicator for firm-year observations after the treatment year. Measures of investments include: (i) change in net fixed assets scaled by beginning of year assets 
(CHPPE) and (ii) capital expenditure scaled by beginning of year assets (CAPEX). Coefficient estimates for AFTER and all control variables (defined in the 
caption of Table 1) have been omitted for brevity. Coefficient on TREAT is suppressed because of firm fixed effects. State represents the state in which a firm’s 
headquarters is situated. t-statistics, reported in parentheses, are calculated based on standard errors obtained by clustering at the firm level. Statistical 
significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.  
 
 
CAPEX CHPPE 
KZ Index Dividend Payment 
Hadlock-Pierce Approach 
KZ Index Dividend Payment 
Hadlock-Pierce Approach 
Size Age Size Age 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TREAT*AFTER (High Slack) -0.001 -0.002 -0.017** -0.009 -0.004 -0.002 -0.014* -0.005 (-0.169) (-0.394) (-2.258) (-1.184) (-0.483) (-0.345) (-1.699) (-0.557) 
TREAT*AFTER (Low Slack) -0.034*** -0.046*** -0.022** -0.039*** -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.018* -0.030** (-3.995) (-4.032) (-2.168) (-2.949) (-3.227) (-2.958) (-1.771) (-2.480) 
        
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm and 
State*Year fixed effects 
        
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 5,372 5,787 5,791 5,791 6,273 6,897 6,902 6,902 
R-squared 0.648 0.649 0.644 0.645 0.528 0.522 0.518 0.520 
 
 
